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Note

Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and

Membership Organizations Unconnected to
a Physical Facility
Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America
I. INTRODUCTION

In Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 At the time of the 1964 Act, almost
ninety years had passed since Congress last focused on civil rights legislation
in public accommodations? While Congress clearly intended for Title II to
end racial and certain other types of discrimination in public
accommodations,4 congressional intent with regard to entities that do not
clearly resemble any of Title II's specific examples is less clear.
The Welsh court was the first court to address the question of
congressional intent and the scope of Title II for entities like the Boy
Scouts-membership organizations that do not require a close connection to
a particular physical facility. This Note examines the sources behind the
court's decision, evaluates the court's theory of interpretation, and predicts the
persuasive and precedential value of the decision for future courts' interpreting
the ambiguities of Title II.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Seven-year old Mark Welsh and his father, Elliott Welsh, originally
brought suit against the Boy Scouts of America and Boy Scouts of America

1. 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993).

2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988).
3. 18 Stat. 335 (1875). The Civil Rights Act of 1875 contained a public
accommodations

section attempting

to guarantee

equal access to public

accommodations to persons of every race and color. The Act did not require state
action in that it applied to individual offenders. Id. Therefore, it was struck down in
the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1988) states: "All persons shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section,
without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin."
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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West Suburban Council No. 147 in Illinois federal district court.5 In their
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the
Welshes asked the court to overturn the district court's refusal to grant an

injunction barring BSA from excluding individuals who do not believe in

God.6 After being excluded because they refused to recite the Boy Scout
Oath, which requires scouts to express a belief in God,7 the Welshes sought
an order requiring the Council to admit Mark Welsh as a youth member and
Elliott Welsh as an adult partner in the Tiger Cub and Cub Scout programs.8
The Welshes argued that the public accommodations section of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964' governs BSA, because BSA's emphasis on recreational
and fun activities renders it a "place of entertainment" within the scope of the
statute.'0 Thus, the Welshes claimed BSA impermissibly discriminated on
the basis of religion in violation of the statute," which bars discrimination
based on religion in places of public accommodation.' 2 BSA argued (1) it
is not a "place of public accommodation" for Title II purposes; (2) even if
Title II governs BSA, it qualifies within the private club exception of the
statute; and (3) requiring BSA to accept members who refuse to profess a
members' First Amendment rights of intimate
belief in God would violate the
3
and expressive association.'
Asserting these three arguments, BSA filed a pre-trial motion for
dismissal challenging the sufficiency of the claim's factual assertions to state
a legal claim for relief.'4 The district court declined to dismiss the motion

5. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 787 F. Supp. 1511 (N.D. III. 1992)
[hereinafter Welsh Il], aff'd, 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993). For simplicity, this Note
refers to the Boy Scouts of America and Boy Scouts of America West Suburban
Council No. 147 collectively as BSA.
6. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
Welsh III], affg 787 F. Supp. 1511 (N.D. III. 1992).
7. The Boy Scout Oath states: "On my honor I will do my best to do my duty
to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law, to help other people at all times,
to keep myself physically strong, mentally awake and morally straight." Welsh11,787
F. Supp. at 1515.
8. Welsh I, 993 F.2d at 1268.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988).
10. The coverage of Title II includes "any motion picture house, theater, concert
hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment .... " 42
U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) (1988); Welsh III, 993 F.2d at 1269.
11. Welsh 11, 787 F.Supp. at 1512.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988).
13. Welsh 11, 787 F.Supp. at 1512-13.
14. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1416 (N.D. I11.1991)
[hereinafter Welsh 1], aff'd, 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/5
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as a matter of law.' 5 The court found that each of BSA's grounds in support
of dismissal either lacked substantial legal authority or raised questions of fact
not suited for disposition in the context of a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.' 6
After trial, the district court held BSA not to be a place of public
accommodation within the scope of Title II because it did not "operate from
or avail [its] members of access to a particular facility or location."' 7 Since
Title II did not cover BSA, the court found it unnecessary to reach either
BSA's private club defense or First Amendment defense. 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court, holding that BSA fails to qualify as a place of
public accommodation under Title II because no particular facility or location
is closely associated with BSA. 9 Writing for the majority, Judge Coffey
noted that it was unnecessary to reach the question of whether BSA qualifies
under the private club exception to Title 11.20 However, in dicta the majority
responded to the dissent's private club analysis and argued that BSA is a
private club within the exemption in the statute.2 ' The court held that BSA,
a membership organization which does not bear a close connection to a
particular establishment, place or facility, is not governed by Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.'

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Whether a membership organization without a close connection to a
physical facility is governed by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
a question of first impression for federal courts. The Seventh Circuit's
decision was supported by the social context and legislative history of Title
II;' by federal court decisions interpreting the entertainment and private club
sections of Title II;24 and by state court cases interpreting state statutes which
are similar to Title 11.25

15. Id. at 1413.
16. Id. at 1436.

17. Welsh 11, 787 F. Supp. at 1541.
18. Id.at 1540.

19. Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1275.
20. Id.at 1276.
21. Id.at 1277.

at 1275.
22. Id.
23. See infra notes 26-52 and accompanying text.

24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) (1988) (entertainment), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1988)
(private club exemption); see infra notes 53-87, 148-58 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., United States Jaycees v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 59

A. Social Context and Legislative History
When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Blacks were
routinely denied access in places of public accommodation nationwide.
President John F. Kennedy called the discrimination "a daily insult."2 6 He
noted as "particularly tragic" the obstacles to normal travel faced by Blacks
on vacation who were forced to "stretch [their] endurance to limits
unnecessary for Whites in search of acceptable accommodations."27 Only
thirty-two states had exercised their power to deal with segregation by passing
public accommodations statutes.2 8
Few of the statutes extended
comprehensively to establishments that conducted public businesses,29 and the
statutes were inconsistent from state to state.30
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in places of public
accommodation that affect commerce or are supported by state action. 31
Subsection (b) provides a list of those establishments that serve the public and
are places of public accommodation for the purposes of Title 11.32 The list
has four divisions delineating establishments that provide lodging to transient
guests, 33 facilities such as restaurants and cafeterias that sell food for
consumption on the premises, 34 places of exhibition or entertainment such as
theaters and sports stadiums, 35 and establishments physically located within
establishments otherwise covered by the subsection that claim to serve the
patrons of the covered establishment. 6

Discrimination, 463 N.E.2d 1151 (Mass. 1984) [hereinafter MCAD]; see also infra
notes 88-93, 137-47 and accompanying text.
26. U.S.C.C.A.N. 1735 (July 20, 1964), cited in Harry T. Quick, Public
Accommodations: A Justificationof Title 11 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 16 W.
RESERVE L. REv. 660, 663 (1965).

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 358-59 (1964).
Quick, supra note 26, at 666.
Id. at 667.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(b) (1988).
Id. § 2000a(b).
Id. § 2000a(b)(1).
Id. § 2000a(b)(2).
Id. § 2000a(b)(3).
Id. § 2000a(b)(4).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/5
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Subsections (c) and (d) define when an operation affects commerce or is
supported by state action.37 Subsection (e) excludes from coverage
a "private
38
club or other establishment not in fact open to the public."
Statements by congressional committees point to a broad legislative
purpose for Title II. For example, the Senate Commerce Committee stated
that Title II's object was to vindicate "the deprivation of personal dignity that
surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments."39 The
House Judiciary Committee Report stated that:
another signpost of freedom must be extended to the Negro if he is to
overcome racial inequality and if our country is to live up to its national
ideals. This is the opportunity for every individual, regardless of the color
of his skin to have access to places of public accommodation.4 °
Despite committee statements that point to a broad purpose for Title II,
other legislative statements suggest that Title II was drafted to be specific in
its coverage. RepresentativeLindsay characterizedTitle II as "pinpointed" and
"nonsweeping"."' Senator Magnuson, the Senate floor manager for Title II,
stated that the four numbered subparagraphs of section 2000a(b) clearly and
explicitly describe the types of establishments covered.42
It is evident that members of Congress understood that Title II did not
cover all public accommodations. Representative Kastenmeier recommended
passage of the Act, but called Title II "deficient in that it guarantees equal
access to only some public accommodations." 43 He said that the bill would
allow continued discrimination in bowling alleys "and other places
of
4
recreation and participation sports, unless such places serve food.""
Although the basis of the private club exemption may be inferred from
the social context and legislative history of the Act, few clues exist as to the
factors Congress expected courts to use in determining whether an
establishment is a private club. Most likely, the exemption is based on the

37. Id. § 2000a(c)-(d).
38. Id. § 2000a(e).
39. S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1964), cited in Quick, supra
note 26, at 661 n.9.
40. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 262 (1964),
cited in Quick, supra note 26, at 661-62 n.9.
41. 110 CONG. REc. 1924 (1964), cited in William J. Hassing, Case Comment,
Civil Rights Act of 1964-Amusement Park Is Not A Place of Public Accommodation
As Defined in Section 201 of the Act, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 440, 444 n.29 (1968).
42. 110 CONG. REc. 7405 (1964), cited in Hassing, supra note 41, at 444 n.30.
43. H.R. REP. NO. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1963), cited in Hassing,
supra note 41, at 444 n.28.
44. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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belief that the First Amendment protects rights of association and privacy.45

Virtually the only recorded legislative history regarding the private club
exemption is the Senate discussion surrounding an amendment in the bill
proposed by the House of Representatives." No regular or conference
committee reports exist because the House-Senate compromise was
informal.47
Senate discussion of the amendment to the exemption suggests that courts
ought not focus on the establishment's motive in forming an alleged private
club. 48 The original House bill granted the exemption to "bona fide private
clubs,"49 but the final version exempts a "private club or other establishment
not in fact open to the public."50 Those who sought the change of language
wanted to ensure that the motivation for the organization of the club would
not be a factor in courts' analysis.5' Senator Humphrey noted, however, that
the new language would not allow a sham club to evade the law.52

45. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1957), first announced the right
of association. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), the Court
stated: "The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion ....[This Court has] protected forms of 'association' that are
not political in the customary sense but pertain to the social, legal, and economic
benefit of the members." Cited in Robert L. Thompson, Case Comment, Civil Rights
Act of 1964-Public Accommodations-PrivateClub Exemption, 45 N.C. L. REV. 498,
500 n.13 (1967).
See also H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1963), Additional
Views on H.R. 7152 of Honorable William M. McCullock, et al. "Moreover, where
freedom of association might logically come into play as in cases of private
organizations, Title II quite properly exempts bona fide private clubs and other
establishments." Id. at 9, cited in Note, Public AccommodationsLaws and the Private
Club, 54 GEo. L.J. 915, 918 n.19 (1966).
46. Thompson, supra note 45, at 501.
47. Note, supra note 45, at 920.
48. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.

49. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(e) (1963), cited in Note, supranote
45, at 920 n.29.

50. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1988), cited in Note, supra note 45, at
920 n.30.
51. "Its purpose is to make clear that the test of whether a private club, or an
establishment not open to the public, is exempt from Title II, relates to whether it is,
in fact, a private club, or whether it is, in fact, an establishment not open to the public.
It does not relate to whatever purpose or animus the organizers may have had in mind
when they originally brought the organization into existence." 110 CONG. REC. 13697
(1964) (remarks of Senator Long of Louisiana), cited in Note, supra note 45, at 920
n.3 1.
52. "The test as to whether a private club is really a private club, or whether it
is an establishment, really not open to the public is a factual one ....It is not our
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/5
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B. Federal Court Decisions

Federal court cases interpreting the "places of entertainment"
subparagraph of Title II illustrate courts' uncertainty about the role of the
section's specifically cited examples.54 42 U.S.C. Section 2000a(b)(3)
includes the following in the term "place of public accommodation:"
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium
or other place of exhibition or entertainment;
5 must
An early line of cases held that the principle of ejusdem generis"
be used to determine the meaning of the phrase "other place of . . .
entertainment." 6 Later cases rejected the limited interpretation of "other
place of exhibition or entertainment" produced by applying the ejusdem
generis principle." The court in Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc.,58
held that an amusement park was a place of entertainment within Title II, even
though the park was not a place that presented shows, performances, and
exhibitions to a passive audience. 9 Recognizing that ejusdem generis is "an

intention to permit this section to be used to evade the prohibitions of the title by the
creation of sham establishments which are in fact open to all the white public and not
to Negroes. We intend only to protect the genuine privacy of private clubs or other
establishments whose membership is genuinely selective on some reasonable basis."
(remarks of Senator Humphrey) Note, supra note 45, at 920 n.32.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) (1988).
54. See infra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
55. "Of the same kind, class or nature."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 357

(Abridged 6th ed. 1991). Cuevas v. Sdrales, 344 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1014 (1966), in holding that a bar was not an "other facility
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises" stated:
"Ordinarily, when specific terms in a statute are followed by general terms, the general
terms are limited to matters similar to those specified, unless to do so would defeat the
obvious purposes of the statute." Id. at 1020 (citations omitted), cited in Hassing,
supra note 41, at 441 n.4.
56. Kyles v. Paul, 263 F. Supp. 412, 419 (D. Ark. 1967); Miller v. Amusement
Enterprises, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 523, 525 (D. La. 1966), aff'd, 391 F.2d 86 (5th Cir.
1967), contrary result reached on reh'g en banc 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968);
Robertson v. Johnston, 249 F. Supp. 618 (D. La. 1966), rev'don other grounds, 376
F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1966).
57. E.g., Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968) (en
banc), reaching a contrary result from that reached in its own prior decision at Miller
v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 391 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1967).
58. 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968) (en bane).
59. Miller, 394 F.2d at 350.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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old and accepted rule of statutory construction," the court stated it did not
believe that the rule compelled an interpretation of words and phrases in the
statute which would give them definitions or interpretations "different from
their common and ordinary meaning."6 Furthermore, the court stated that
the rule did not require interpreting the statute so narrowly that the obvious
and overriding purpose of the statute is defeated. 6' The court found that
although the legislative history of the public accommodation section and the
place of entertainment section is "inconclusive" and "obscure," the "general
intent and overriding purpose of the act was to end discrimination in certain

facilities open to the general public."'62
In Daniel v. Paul,63 the Supreme Court specifically approved the en
banc Miller decision and ruled that an amusement park or recreation area,
which provided recreational facilities to White members of the general public
who would pay the 25-cent annual "club dues," was a place of entertainment
under Title II.'
The Court recognized that most of the discussion in
Congress regarding the extent of Title II's coverage centered on places of
spectator entertainment rather than recreational areas. 65 However, the Court
concluded the scope of the phrase "place of... entertainment" should not be
restricted to "the primary objects of Congress's concern when a natural
reading of its language would call for broader coverage."' Also, the Court
stated that in light of Title II's overriding purpose,67 it agreed with the en
banc Miller decision that the phrase "place of entertainment" should be
interpreted "according to its generally accepted meaning and applied to
68
recreational areas.,

The Miller and Daniel decisions spawned a series of federal cases in
which courts were asked to decide whether or not membership organizations
closely connected to places of recreation were governed by the statute. Using
the "ordinary usage" definition of "place of entertainment" set forth in Miller
and Daniel,courts extended Title II's coverage to a non-profit association that

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 349.
63. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
64. Id.at 299.
65. Id. at 307.
66. Id.
67. One statement of the overriding purpose of Title II is: "to remove the daily
affront and humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities
ostensibly open to the general public;" H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18
(1963), cited in Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307-08.
68. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 308.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/5
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operated a swimming pool and skating rink;69 a teacher organization that held
public meetings in a public school auditorium;70 a youth football league that
owned a recreational facility;7' a club that owned 400 acres of land for
hunting and fishing;72 a club that owned a swimming pool;" and YMCAs
that operated swimming pools, gymnasiums, and health clubs.74 However,
federal courts before Welsh had not yet considered whether a close connection
to a recreational facility is required for a club or organization to qualify as a
"place 6f entertainment" under Title II.
Federal courts examine numerous factors to determine whether an
establishment is in fact a private club.7" Courts recognize that there is no
single test,76 and different courts tend to emphasize different factors.77 The
only guidance offered by the statute is that to qualify for the exemption, the
establishment must not "in fact" be "open to the public.""8 Courts examine
the private nature of an establishment in light of the Civil Rights Act's clear
purpose as articulated by Senator Humphrey; to protect only "the genuine
79
privacy of private clubs . . . whose membership is genuinely selective.
Thus, selectivity is the common factor all courts consider when deciding the
private club issue.8"

69. Williams v. Rescue Fire Co., 254 F. Supp. 556, 563 (D. Md. 1966).
70. Auerbach v. African Am. Teachers Ass'n, 356 F. Supp. 1046, 1048 (E.D.
N.Y. 1973).
71. United States v. Slidell Youth Football Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 474,482-83 (E.D.
La. 1974).
72. Durham v. Red Lake Fishing and Hunting Club, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 954, 959
(W.D. Tex. 1987).
73. United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 790 (E.D. Pa.
1989).
74. Smith v. YMCA of Montgomery, 462 F.2d 634,636 (5th Cir. 1972); Nesmith
v. YMCA of Raleigh, 397 F.2d 96, 99-100 (4th Cir. 1968).
75. For a comprehensive discussion of the private club factors used by federal
courts and illustrative cases, see Donald Kramer, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Sec. 201(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000a(e)),
Excluding From the Act's Coverage Private Clubs and Other EstablishmentsNot in
Fact Open to the Public, 8 A.L.R. FED 634 (1971).

76. Nesmith, 397 F.2d at 102.
77. Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1151 (S.D. Tex. 1970). For
example, the district court in Lansdowne Swim Club identified seven factors it would
consider in determining whether the club was truly private. Both the dissent and
majority in Welsh referenced these factors in their analysis of BSA. Welsh I1, 993
F.2d at 1276; Welsh I1, 993 F.2d at 1282-83 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1988).
79. 110 CONG. REc. 13697 (1964), cited in Nesmith, 397 F.2d at 102.
80. Wright, 315 F. Supp. at 1151.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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However, it appears that an exclusive membership policy will not
convince a court that an establishment's membership is "genuinely selective."
Instead, courts implicitly require that the underlying basis for the
exclusiveness be an acceptable one. For example, several courts found that
an establishment violated Title II by denying membership or participation to
Blacks."' The establishments' membership policies, at least in practice, were
genuinely selective in that the establishments selected only white persons for
membership.82 The courts rejected that form of selectivity, finding the
establishments to be non-selective, and describing them as "open in general to
all of the public who are members of the white race."83
Courts are faced with the dilemma of remaining faithful to Congress's
words, "not in fact open to the public,"84 while at the same time seeking to
enforce the Civil Rights Act's overriding purpose of vindicating "the
deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access
to public establishments."85 To solve the conflict, courts reject membership

selection criteria that fly in the face of Title II's overriding purpose. Courts
then look to various other factors to determine if an establishment qualifies as
a private club.
Courts give themselves a great deal of flexibility in determining which
other factors should be considered and the weight each should carry. In
Wright v. Cork Club,86 the court stated that "each case must be decided in its
own particular setting and factual background and within the context of the
entire record before the Court."87

81. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973);
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S.
298 (1969); Nesmith v. YMCA of Raleigh, 397 F.2d 961 (4th Cir. 1968).
82. Tillman, 410 U.S. at 438; Sullivan at 396 U.S. 236; Daniel,395 U.S. at 302;
Nesmith, 397 F.2d at 102.
83. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 302 (quoting Kyles v. Paul, 263 F. Supp. 412, 418
(1967)). See also Tillman, 410 U.S. at 431; Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 236, membership
was "open to every white person within the geographic area, there being no selective
element other than race; Nesmith, 397 F.2d at 102 (YMCA lacked "any genuine
selectivity, (other than upon racial lines.)").
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1988).
85. S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1964), cited in Quick, supra
note 26, at 661 n.9.
86. 315 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
87. Id. at 1153. The court went on to articulate certain "minimum standards"
which the members of the court believed should be met by any organization qualifying
for Title II's private club exemption.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/5
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C. State Court Decisions
Various state courts interpreting state public accommodations statutes
similar to Title II have addressed the issue of whether or not a membership
organization without a close connection to a physical facility can be a "place
of public accommodation" for purposes of the statute."8
A series of regionally diverse cases challenged the United States Jaycees'
policy of granting membership exclusively to men as violative of state public
accommodations statutes which prohibited sex discrimination and were similar
in scope to Title 1.89 With one exception,' the courts ruled that the word
"place" in the states' public accommodations statutes should be interpreted
according to its common and accepted meaning." Because the United States
Jaycees did not constitute a place within the word's ordinary reference to
physical situs, the organization was not prohibited from excluding women. 92
In contrast, "place" has been held by some courts to be a term of
convenience rather than a term of limitation. These courts believe that "place"
is used because public accommodations are often provided at fixed

locations.93
The broad purpose of Title II as expressed in its legislative history, the
evolving interpretation of its scope, and the apparent limits imposed by its

language culminate in one question raised by the facts of the Welsh case: In
light of Congress's words can Title II properly be used as a tool to eradicate
religious discrimination in organized groups as well as in physical facilities?

The Welsh majority's response in the negative finds its real basis, not in a

88. See infra notes 138-40, 142-44, 147.
89. United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008 (Ala. 1983); United States
Jaycees v. Bloomfield, 434 A.2d 1379 (D.C. 1981); United States Jaycees v. Iowa
Civil Rights Comm'n, 427 N.W.2d 450 (Iowa, 1988); United States Jaycees v.
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 463 N.E.2d 1151 (Mass. 1984); United
States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981).
90. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981). The
language of the Minnesota statute arguably is much broader than that of Title II. See
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(18) (West 1991) in which the legislature specially defined
"place of public accommodation" as "a business, accommodation, refreshment,
entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or
not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are
extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public."
91. Richardet,666 P.2d at 1011; Bloomfield, 434 A.2d at 1381; Iowa CivilRights
Comm'n, 427 N.W.2d at 454; MCAD, 463 N.E.2d at 1156.
92. Richardet, 666 P.2d at 1011.
93. National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, 318 A.2d 33, 37
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) [hereinafter NOWV]; United States Power Squadrons
v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 452 N.E.2d 1199, 1203-04 (N.Y. 1983).
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view of government's role in regulating discrimination, but in the court's
convictions regarding congressional intent and statutory interpretation. 4
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
In Welsh, the majority found that BSA was not governed by Title II
because (1) Congress did not intend for Title II to govern membership
organizations like BSA, as BSA can be correctly described as a membership
organization without a close connection to a physical facility;9" (2) state
courts interpreting state statutes like Title II have excluded membership
organizations like BSA;96 (3) no federal court opinion has held that Title II
governs a membership organization without a close connection to a physical
facility;97 and (4) BSA fits within the private club exemption to Title 1I.9'
The court found that Congress did not intend the phrase "place of public
accommodation" to govern membership organizations, such as BSA, that are
not closely connected to a physical facility. 9 According to the court, the
statute's plain meaning shows that it governs an entity which serves the public
and may accurately be described as an "establishment," "place," or
"facility."' '
In the court's view, the requirement that the establishment
serve the public is necessary in order to avoid irrational results.'' The court
illustrated its view by pointing to the broad interpretation of Title II embraced
by plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiffs counsel stated "that his interpretation of the
parameters of Title II would require an organization that studied Israeli culture
and history to admit into their group (meeting in a private home) a neo-nazi
02
who believed in, and was dedicated to, the destruction of Israel.'
The court's requirement that a covered establishment be classifiable as an
establishment, place, or facility rests on the majority's interpretations of the
particular words and examples used in the statute. 0 3 The court pointed out

that Title II differentiates the covered entities as "places," "establishments,"
94. See Welsh II, 993 F.2d at 1269 ("A reading of the statute for its plain
meaning renders but one conclusion.").
95. Id. at 1269.
96. Id. at 1271.
97. Id. at 1272.
98. Id. at 1276-77.
99. Id. at 1269.
100. Id.
101. Id.
at 1274.
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
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"lodges," and "facilities."' 4 None of the fifteen specific examples in the
Furthermore,
statute even slightly resembles a membership organization.'
the court asserted that Congress clearly distinguished between those entities
that require a close connection to a specific physical facility in order to serve
their purposes (such as hotels, theaters, and sports arenas) and those, such as
BSA, that do not.' 6 Drawing an analogy to a hypothetical city ordinance
requiring only that all dogs be licensed, 7 the court found the plaintiffs'
view of Title II analogous to an interpretation of the ordinance also requiring
that all cats be licensed." 8 Similarly, according to the court, extending Title
II beyond facilities to include a different type of entity lacks a logical
basis. 9
In requiring that a covered entity be classifiable as an establishment,
place, or facility, the court rejected the conclusion of the courts in National
Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball"' and United States
Power Squadron v. State Human Rights Appeal Board"' that "place" is a
term of convenience rather than limitation." 2 The court cited United States
v. Bell". as support for the proposition that a statute's language is the most
trustworthy indication of congressional intent."' The majority argued that
if Congress had intended broader coverage for Title II than is allowed under
a literal interpretation of "place," it could have drafted the language without
The court suggested alternative language
using the term "place.""'
fulfill such a broad intent: "each of the
to
used
Congress could have
the public, is a public accommodation within the
following, if it serves
'" 6
title."
this
of
meaning
Finally, in requiring that a covered entity be classifiable as an
establishment, place, or facility, the court rejected the dissent's argument that
a private home in which scout meetings are held could be transformed into a
place of public accommodation." 7 The court pointed to subsection (b)(1)

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1269.
Id.
Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1269.
Id.
Id. at 1269-70.
318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
452 N.E.2d 1199 (N.Y. 1983).

112. Welsh111, 993 F.2d at 1272.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

936 F.2d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 1991).
993 F.2d at 1273.
Welsh M11,

Id.
Id.
at 1274.
Id.
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of section 2000a, which
excludes private homes from the set of covered public
8
accommodations.!
The majority maintained that the plain meaning of Title II should govern
the instant case." 9 It cited Richards v. United States 20 as support for the
idea that words' ordinary meanings convey congressional intent.'2 ' The
strong presumption that words' ordinary meaning should be used to determine
congressional intent is only rebuttable when a contrary legislative intent is
clearly conveyed." The majority found that such a contrary intention was

not present in regard to Title 11.123 In Daniel, the Supreme Court stated that
the overriding purpose of Title II was "to remove the daily affront and
humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly
open to the general public."'24 In Welsh, the majority noted this overriding
25
purpose defined the outer limits of how broadly Title II may be read.'
The court further supported its claim that Congress did not intend Title
II to cover groups like BSA when it rejected the dissent's rationale for
expanding Title II's traditional coverage. 26 Judge Cummings in dissent
argued in a footnote that the Americans with Disabilities Act, 27 which also
regulates public accommodations, includes an expanded definition of public
accommodation and establishes that Congress meant to approve of those cases
which have defined "public accommodation" expansively.2 2 The majority
responded by maintaining that if Congress had meant to include membership
organizations which lack a close connection to a physical facility, then
Congress would have included such a command in the ADA. 29 Instead, the
ADA contains over fifty specific facilities covered by the regulations, and
none of them are membership organizations lacking a close connection to a
physical facility. 3 ' The majority refused "to read into the statute what
Congress has declined to include,"' noting that courts "must assume that

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id
Id at 1269.
369 U.S. 1 (1962).
Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1269.
Id. at 1270 (citing Ardestani v. I.N.S., 112 S.Ct. 515, 520 (1991)).
Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1270.
Id.(citing Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969)).
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12181 (West. Supp. 1992) [hereinafter ADA].
Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1281 n.6 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1270.
Id.
Id.
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Congress understood the meaning of the words it incorporated into the
[Act].' 32
Throughout its opinion; the court made it clear that BSA lacks a close
connection to a physical facility.'33 BSA's purpose is to train boys to
"respect God, their country and their fellow man," and to develop high moral
character.3 4
The court further described BSA as a "participative
organization," where young boys take part in social activity and
interaction. 135 None of these
functions requires a close connection to a
136
facility.
physical
particular
The court noted that state courts interpreting state statutes similar to Title
II excluded the United States Jaycees, a membership organization similar to
BSA, because of the Jaycees' lack of connection to a physical location or
facility. 137 Two grounds summarize the state courts' reasoning: (1)
including the Jaycees in the statutes would require the addition of another type
of conduct to the statute rather than another physical site; and (2) there
is a distinction between membership organizations like Little League Baseball
and the YMCA, where membership serves as a "ticket" to a particular physical
facility, and membership organizations like the Boy Scouts, ill which
membership allows an individual to participate in group activities that do not
depend on a particular facility.'
The court noted that all but two state cases interpreting state public
accommodations statutes to cover organizations like the Boy Scouts are
distinguishable because the state statutes at issue were broader than Title
11.140 Furthermore, the majority rejected the analysis of the two cases
interpreting state statutes similar to Title 11 to include membership
organizations that do not qualify as a literal place.14 ' In NOW' 142 and
132. Welsh XII, 993 F.2d at 1270 (quoting Jones v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac Co.,
848 F.2d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 1988)).
133. Welsh I1, 993 F.2d at 1270.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1275.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1271.

138. Welsh I, 993 F.2d at 1271 (citing United States Jaycees v. Massachusetts
Comm'n Against Discrimination, 463 N.E.2d 1151, 1159 (Mass. 1984) [hereinafter
MCAD]).
139. Welsh III, 993 F.2d at 1271 (citing MCAD, 463 N.E.2d at 1159).
140. For cases interpreting more broadly worded statutes, see Welsh I1, 993 F.2d
at 1271 (citing Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325
(1983); Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts, Inc. v. Comm'n on Human Rights and
Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352 (Conn. 1987); United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305
N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981)).
141. Welsh I1, 993 F.2d at 1272.
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United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Board,'43 the
state courts applied "word of convenience" analysis to the word "place" rather
than "limitation" analysis.'" The Welsh court rejected this approach as
contrary to correct statutory construction. 4 The court argued such analysis
makes "place" a superfluous word and causes the fifteen specific examples to
be devoid of any illuminating meaning.'46 Instead, the majority found the
analysis by the court in MCAD to be doctrinally superior.'47
The court pointed out that no federal court has held that Title II governs
a membership organization without a close connection to a physical facility,
whereas several federal court opinions have held that Title II governs
membership organizations closely connected to a physical facility.' 48 Title
II applied to these organizations because they conducted public meetings in a
public facility or they operated facilities, such as gymnasiums and swimming
pools, that were open to the public.'49 The court contrasted such
organizations with BSA, where five to eight boys meet in a private home."'
The majority rejected the dissent's application of Hornick v. Noyes,'
a case in which the Seventh Circuit held that Title II covered a YWCA that

142. 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974), cited in Welsh II, 993 F.2d
at 1272.
143. 452 N.E.2d 1199 (N.Y. 1983), cited in Welsh 11, 993 F.2d at 1272.
144. NOW, 318 A.2d at 37; Power Squadrons,452 N.E.2d at 1203-04.
145. Welsh I1, 993 F.2d at 1272.

146. Id.
147. Id.; see text accompanying note 139, supra.
148. See Welsh I1, 993 F.2d at 1272 (citing Smith v. YMCA of Montgomery,
462 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1972) (the YMCA operated gymnasiums, a health club
and swimming pools); Nesmith v. YMCA of Raleigh, N.C., 397 F.2d 96, 99-100 (4th
Cir. 1968) (same); United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 790
(E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 894 F.2d 83 (3rd Cir. 1990) (club operated a swimming pool);
Durham v. Red Lake Fishing and Hunting Club, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 954, 959 (W.D.

Tex. 1987) (club owned 400 acres of land for hunting and fishing); United States v.
Slidell Youth Football Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 474, 483 (E.D. La. 1974) (youth football
league owned a recreational facility with fields, grandstand and a concession stand);
Auerbach v. African Am. Teachers' Ass'n, 356 F. Supp. 1046, 1048 (E.D. N.Y. 1973)
(organization held public meetings in a public school auditorium); Wesley v. City of
Savannah, 294 F. Supp. 698, 701-02 (S.D. Ga. 1969) (city operated a public golf
course and was barred from hosting a racially discriminatory golf tournament);
Williams v. Rescue Fire Co., 254 F. Supp. 556, 563 (D. Md. 1966) (non-profit
association operated a swimming pool and skating rink)).
149. Welsh I1, 993 F.2d at 1272.
150. Id, (citing Welsh 11, 787 F. Supp. at 1516).
151. 708 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1031 (1984), cited in
Welsh I, 993 F.2d at 1273.
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offered permanent and temporary housing." 2 The majority distinguished
Only one
Hornick in that it was not a membership organization case.'
4 Therefore, the YWCA was
housing.
it
provided
at
issue,
and
YWCA was
specifically covered by Title II because of the lodging provision of Section
Unlike BSA, the YMCA had a set physical location. 6
2000a(b)(1)'
The majority also rejected the dissent's contention that Hornick must
signify that rent paid by a membership organization is relevant to its status
under Title II.' s7 The court noted that without a gymnasium, a YWCA or
whereas BSA requires no
YMCA would be unable to serve its function,
58
function.1
its
serve
to
order
in
facility
physical
Finally, the majority responded to the dissent's private club analysis,
arguing that even apart from BSA's failure to qualify as a place of public
accommodation, the organization is exempt from Title II because it is a
private club.1 9 The majority pointed to the seven factors emphasized in
Lansdowne Swim Club6 ' and focused on three of them to argue for the
Scouts' exemption. 6 '
The majority found that BSA satisfied the first and most important
factor-selectivity. 62 Citing the requirement that there be a "plan or
purpose of exclusiveness,"" the majority found that BSA exercises sound
discretion and judgment when admitting new members."6 BSA admits boys
from various backgrounds, but the Scout Constitution, Scout Oath and Scout
bylaws are evidence of the exercise of judgment in admission. 65 The Court
noted that the Scout Oath pledges a duty to God, a central tenet of the

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Hornick,708 F.2d at 324, cited in Welsh II1, 993 F.2d at 1273.
Welsh I1,993 F.2d at 1273.
Id.
Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (1988)).
Id.

157. Id.

at 1273-74.
158. Id.
at 1276.
159. Id.
160. The factors are: "(1) the genuine selectivity of the group; (2) the
membership's control over the operations of the establishment; (3) the history of the
organization; (4) the use of facilities by nonmembers; (5) the club's purpose; (6)
whether the club advertises for members, and (7) whether the club is nonprofit or for
profit." Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1276.
161. Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1276.
162. Id.
163. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), cited in Welsh
111, 993 F.2d at 1276.
164. Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1276.
165. Id.
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organization since 1911.166 Furthermore, no one was arguing that the oath
had been adopted as a subterfuge to escape the coverage of Title 11.167
Next, the majority used the Scout Oath to reach a favorable conclusion
for the Scouts on two additional Lansdowne Swim Club factors. The fourth
factor-the history of BSA-as reflected in the constitution, bylaws, and oath,
demonstrates a constant organizational commitment, since 1907, to adhere to
the principles reflected therein.'68 The court concluded that the private club
exemption was designed to preserve
the right of such truly private clubs to
69
continue their unique existence.
Also, the majority noted that the Boy Scout Oath leads to a favorable
conclusion for BSA under the fifth Lansdowne Swim Club factor-the purpose
of the organization's existence. 7 BSA would be unable to carry out one
of the three tenets contained in its oath if Title
II required it to accept
171
members who refuse to attest to a belief in God.

Finally, the majority pointed to the seventh factor-BSA's nonprofit

7
status-as further evidence that BSA is a private club.' 1

B. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Cummings in dissent agreed that BSA should not be forced to
admit the plaintiffs as members of the organization.' However, he argued
that the freedom to exclude the plaintiffs rests solely in the freedom of
association guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.7 Requiring the Boy Scouts
to accept atheists would cause them to suffer the very type of harm the First
Amendment was designed to prohibit. 171 Judge Cummings based his
conclusion on three factors: (1) that the series of oaths, the most basic
expression of BSA's tradition and basic values, is highly deserving of First
Amendment protection; 176 (2) that the Scouting tradition's reference to God
is not a proxy for a "deeper and more base desire to exclude those who are

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Such principles are duty to God, duty to one's fellow man, and duty to
oneself. Welsh II, 993 F.2d at 1277.
169. Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1277.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
at 1279 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
174. See id.
at 1283 (Cummings, J., dissenting) (citing United Mine Workers of
Am., Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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different or threatening;"177 and (3) that genuine differences of belief exist
between those who do not believe God exists and those who do.' 78
Judge Cummings argued that the majority's narrow interpretation of Title
II would give any group license to discriminate on a mere whim. 7 9 He

argued that the reasoning used by the majority to support its holding was
flawed. 8 ' In his opinion, the majority's claim that the statute itself is
evidence of congressional intent to exclude certain organizations, rather than
to include others, substitutes the conclusion for the analysis.' 8' The fact the
statute does not list "Boy Scouts" per se is merely evidence that the law is
ambiguous and requires judicial interpretation.'
Second, Judge Cummings criticized the majority's reliance on an absence
of federal case law in support of the plaintiffs. He noted that no federal case
law existed to support the majority's holding either.'83 In light of federal
184
cases urging courts to interpret public accommodations statutes broadly,
he claimed that this "tie may well go to the plaintiffs."' 85
In a footnote, Judge Cummings further argued that Congress's most
recent public accommodations statute, the ADA, 8 6 signals Congressional
approval of cases which interpret public accommodations broadly.'87
Third, Judge Cummings relied on the Seventh Circuit case of Hornickv.
' as authority for requiring that BSA, like the YWCA facility in
Noyes "88

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
395 U.S.

Id.
at 1284 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
at 1279 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
See infra notes 181-93 and accompanying text.
Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1280 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
E.g., Welsh III, 993 F.2d at 1280 (Cummings, J., dissenting) (citing Daniel,
at 308; Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 349 (5th Cir.

1968) (en bane)).
185. Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1280 (Cummings, J., dissenting). Judge Cummings
pointed to five cases for support: New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New
York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary Intern. v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984);

Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d
342 (1969).

186. 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (West Supp. 1992).
187. Welsh If, 993 F.2d at 1281 n.6 (Cummings, J., dissenting). See supra note
186 and accompanying text. The argument rests on the ADA's more lengthy list of
public accommodation examples in comparison to that contained in Title II.
188. 708 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1031 (1984), cited in
Welsh I1,993 F.2d at 1281 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
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Hornick, be considered a public accommodation under Title 1.189 He
rejected as unpersuasive a number of possible distinctions between Hornick
and the instant case."9 Instead, Judge Cummings approved of the analysis
in NOW and Power Squadrons that considered "place" to be a term of

convenience rather than limitation. 9' He asserted that Congress sought to
wipe out discrimination "in all things open and available to the general
population."'"
Fourth, Judge Cummings refused to accord BSA private club status. He
focused on the selectivity criterion, and noted that there is no limit on the
number of boys who canjoin. BSA advertises for new members, and the only
substantive requirement for membership is age (other than the requirement that
the boy believe in God). 93
V. COMMENT
On first blush, the competing positions of the majority and the dissent
appear to revolve around the desirability, or lack thereof, of allowing a group
like BSA to exclude an otherwise qualified candidate for membership solely
on the basis of religion. The dissent objected that the majority's interpretation
of Title II grants BSA and other similar organizations the freedom to
discriminate "against anyone at all on sheer whim."'94 The majority
rhapsodized that regulating the membership of an organization like BSA in a
way which disturbs its founding principles runs the risk of "undermining one
of the seedbeds of virtue that cultivate [sic] the sorts of citizens our nation so
desperately needs."'95
In reality, however, there exists a much more fundamental clash of
competing philosophies. Part V identifies these conflicting core philosophies
as represented by the majority and dissent; evaluates the positions in light of
their ultimate effect on the separation of powers doctrine; and notes the impact
that the majority philosophy will have on the interpretation of Title II.

189. Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1281 (Cummings, Cir. J., dissenting).
190. Judge Cummings found unpersuasive possible distinctions based on the
absence of rent paid by the Boy Scouts, the fact that meetings are held in private
homes, and the transient nature of the Scouts. Id.
at 1281-82.
191. Id. at 1282 (Cummings, J.,
dissenting).
192. Id.
193. Id.
at 1282-83 (Cummings, J.,
dissenting).
194. Id. at 1279 (Cummings, J.,
dissenting).
195. Id.
at 1278 (Cummings, J.,
dissenting).
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A. Conflicting Majority and Dissent Philosophies
The crux of the conflict between the majority and the dissent lies in the
majority's view of proper statutory interpretation versus the dissent's view of
the proper reach of Title II. The fundamental principle of statutory
interpretation providing the foundation for the majority's position is that the
language of the statute, interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the
words,' 96 is the most trustworthy indicator of congressional intent.'97 This
position led Judge Coffey to remark that protecting BSA is justified in light
of Scouting's contribution to a virtuous citizenry.' 98
Judge Coffey's majority opinion contains several indications that the
majority's approach to statutory interpretation is the core conviction
underlying its decision. First and most obviously, the majority opinion is
riddled with statements of this philosophy taken from various cases.'99
Second, the majority deliberately avoided other bases for reaching the same
decision-bases which were arguably less complex and would have buttressed
the opinion if used as additional support." By focusing almost exclusively
on the statutory interpretation issue, the court attempted to demonstrate that
proper statutory interpretation, standing alone, would support the final
conclusion.2 ' Finally, the real possibility that the policy will mean Title II

196. Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1269 (citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1
(1962)).
197. Id. at 1273 (citing United States v. Bell, 936 F.2d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 1991)).
198. Id. at 1278.

199. See, e.g., Ardestani v. INS, 505 U.S. 129 (1991) ("The 'strong presumption'
that the plain language of the statute expresses congressional intent is rebutted only in
'rare and exceptional circumstances,' when a contrary legislative intent is clearly
expressed." (citations omitted)), cited in Welsh III, 993 F.2d at 1270; Richards, 369

U.S. at 9 ("[T]he legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used."), cited in Welsh I1,993 F.2d at 1269; Jones v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac
Co., 848 F.2d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 1988) ([W]e must assume Congress understood the

meaning of the words it incorporated into the [Act]."), cited in Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at
1270.

200. The majority could have (1) argued that BSA is not an "[establishment]
which serves the public," since it limits its membership to boys who are a certain age,
believe in God, are willing to take the Oath and attend meetings, and have parental
permission; (2) argued that BSA is not a "place of exhibition or entertainment" because
BSA's purpose is to build character rather than to entertain; and (3) argued much more
thoroughly that BSA fits the private club exemption to the statute. Since multiple

factors can be used, and no single test exists for private club status, the court could
easily have deluged the opinion with factors favorable to BSA and arguably cemented
BSA's status as a private club under Title II.
201. Although the majority did argue that BSA was exempt as a private club, the
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is unable to prevent socially undesirable discrimination in future cases
provides evidence that the court saw its statutory interpretation philosophy as
one worth preserving, despite the high costs. A future Title II case may
contain identical facts with the exception that the membership organization
may be far less respected than BSA and the group's rationale for exclusion
much less defensible in the eyes of the public. The majority's "place"
analysis, a direct result of its statutory interpretation policy, would require a
finding that Title II does not govern the group.
When applied to the instant case, the majority's statutory interpretation
philosophy runs headlong into the anti-discrimination policy supported by the
dissent. The dissent's core argument is that Title II ought to be used as a tool
to "eradicate discrimination in all things open and available to the general
population."2 2 In response to the majority, the dissent formulated a rival
view of statutory interpretation, arguing that talk about the "plain meaning"
of the words in Title II did not capture Congress's true intent.2 3 In support
of this position, the dissent argued that the Supreme Court has instructed
courts to interpret public accommodations statutes liberally;2" that the
recently passed Americans with Disabilities Act implicitly approves expanded
definitions of public accommodations;2 5 and that there is simply no
"principled distinction" between membership organizations like BSA, which
have no fixed meeting site, and other groups that use or own a facility.2"
B. Separation of Powers
The majority's policy of finding congressional intent in the ordinary
meanings of the words of a statute better preserves the doctrine of separation
of powers inherent in American government.20 7 If the doctrine is based on
the idea that the legislature is uniquely entrusted with the power to draft laws
to solve problems of policy, and the courts are uniquely charged with the

opinion clearly explained that the argument was unnecessary to the decision and was
only propounded as a response to the dissent. Welsh I, 993 F.2d at 1278.
202. Welsh I1,993 F.2d at 1282 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
203. Id. Judge Cummings states that "the meaning, if not the language, of Title
II is simple and unambiguous enough: if it is open to the public, it must be open to
all the public" (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 1280. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 187 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
207. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 469 (Wis. 1980) (Coffey,
J., dissenting).
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power to interpret those laws, 05 then it is vital that courts be given an
objective statement of congressional intent to interpret.
In UnitedStates v. Bell, 9 the Seventh Circuit itself pointed out that the
language of a statute is the language which Congress has carefully chosen,
scrutinized, voted on, and submitted to the President for his signature.2 °
Conversely, other expressions of congressional intent are likely to be
inaccurate. For example, in 1963, President Kennedy articulated the need for
a public accommodations statute by stating that federal action was needed to
"secure the rights of all citizens to the full enjoyment of all facilities which
are open to the general public."2 However, he did not accurately predict
the reach of Title II. Two members of the House later commented that Title
II did not cover all public accommodations.212
In addition, statements from congressional committees about the purpose
of a statute can be inaccurate.

For example, the House Committee on

Commerce stated that the purpose of the Civil Rights Act was to peacefully
and voluntarily solve the "seemingly endless web of racial
discrimination. 2 t 3 The Act's preamble, however, simply describes Title II's
purpose

as providing
14

injunctive

relief for discrimination

in public

accommodations.
The dissenting opinion offered no sources for objective and reliable
statements of congressional intent. Instead, the dissent argued that "words are
arbitrary signs."2 5 The opinion suggested that a liberal reading of the
statute,21 6 combined with the ADA's expansion of public

208. See 1d., cited in Welsh I1,993 F.2d at 1271.

209. 936 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1991).
210. Id. at 341, cited in Welsh I, 993 F.2d at 1273.
211.

HEARINGS ON MISCELLANEOUS PROPOSALS REGARDING THE CIVIL RIGHTS

OF PERSONS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES BEFORE SUBCOMM.
No. 5 OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., ser. 4, pt. 2,

at 1448 (1963), cited in Hassing, supra note 41, at 443 n.25 (emphasis added).
212. The two House members were Representative Kastenmeier ("[Title II] ...
guarantees equal access to only some public accommodations") and Representative
Lindsay (who described Title II as "pinpointed" and "nonsweeping"). Hassing, supra
note 41, at 443-44.
213. Quick, supra note 26, at 669 n.39 (citing Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. (78 Stat.) 2355-2518).
214. Quick, supranote 26, at 669 n.45 (citing The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.

L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)).
215. Welsh I1,993 F.2d at 1282 (Cummings, J., dissenting) (citing Herrmann v.

Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1992)).
216. Welsh I1,993 F.2d at 1280 (Cummings, J., dissenting). See supra note 184-

85 and accompanying text.
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accommodations," 7 and the recognition that "places do not discriminate;
people... do," 8 logically produces the following statement of
congressional intent: "if it is open to the public, it must be open to all the
public."2 9 Lacking an objective definition of congressional intent, judges
are, perhaps unwittingly, more likely to look to personal opinion for the
rationale for declaring a law's proper scope. Such action encroaches on the
uniquely legislative task of enacting laws to solve the problems of public
policy.220
The majority policy gives a more objective statement of congressional
intent by requiring that every word in the statute be given meaning. The
dissent's argument that "place" is a term of convenience rather than
limitation22' represents unharnessed discretion in determining which words

will be given meaning and which words will be considered "convenience
terms," devoid of a defining function.
In summary, the majority's core policy is superior to the dissent's from
the standpoint of the separation of powers doctrine. However, the more
obvious policy conflict surrounding the merits of allowing BSA to
discriminate remains to be evaluated. In support for its core policy that Title
I ought to be used as a tool to eradicate discrimination in all things open and
public, the dissent argued that finding otherwise would allow a membership
organization to discriminate against anyone on sheer whim. 2 However,
after close examination, this is only partly true. It is true that if a membership
organization lacks a close connection to a physical facility, the majority's
position would result in no coverage by Title II, regardless how arbitrary and
destructive the discrimination may be. This is the price the majority is willing
to pay for the arguably greater good of adhering to a means of statutory
interpretation which objectively identifies congressional intent.
Furthermore, the majority's apparently greater willingness to apply the
private club exemption would often remove the bite from the dissent's
argument. If discriminatory membership requirements have a sufficient nexus
with the organization's purpose, the private club exemption will exempt the
group from coverage.2" Notably, because of the nexus requirement, it
cannot be said that the organization is discriminating on "sheer whim," as the
dissent fears. No matter how socially distasteful the exclusion, Congress has

217. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
218. Welsh II1, 993 F.2d at 1282 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
219. Id.
220. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 179.
223. See supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text, discussing the majority's
finding that BSA is a private club.
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recognized that truly private groups have a right to discriminate in deciding
with whom they will associate.224
C. FurtherInterpretationof Title II
The effect of the majority's interpretation of Title II will be seen in the
impact on future methods of interpreting the statute and in the state of
substantive Title II case law. Courts which follow the Seventh Circuit's lead
in interpreting Title II will declare that the words of the statute are the best
source for determining Congressional intent. The policy will merit the revival
in Title II cases of the doctrine of ejusdem generis.22 ' The majority in
Welsh applied the doctrine, although not by name, when it inferred from the
statute's listed examples that Congress had drawn a clear distinction between
"entities that require a close connection to a particular facility to achieve their
objective" and those that do not.226 The majority may have been reluctant
to overtly label the doctrine because of its apparent rejection by the Supreme
Court in Daniel 227 Because ejusdem generis rests on the assumption that
the words of a statute, including its examples, convey congressional intent,
courts can employ the doctrine in determining whether particular entities fall
within the statute's scope.228
The decision's impact on substantive Title II case law must first be
examined in terms of the holding's relation to precedent. Because the case
was one of first impression in federal courts, the case does little to disturb
federal decisions. Similarly, most state court decisions interpreting statutes
similar in scope to Title II received general approval under the majority's
"place" analysis. 229 However, state court decisions that hold the word
"place" in the state statute is a term of convenience rather than limitation will
224. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 106.
227. 395 U.S. 298 (1969). The Court did not, however, reject the doctrine as the
proper means of interpreting Title II. It merely concluded that one of the obvious
purposes of the statute, to cover true places of entertainment, would be defeated if the
doctrine was applied to limit "place of entertainment" to places of spectator
entertainment, as was true of the specific examples in § 2000a(b)(3). Daniel,395 U.S.
at 307-08. Such a decision is provided for within the doctrine's terms as stated in
Cuevas v. Sdrales, 344 F.2d 1019, 1020 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,382 U.S. 1014
(1966); See supra note 51.
228. Of course, an element of reasonableness in application will continue to be
necessary. A court cannot responsibly locate coincidental similarities in the statute's

examples, bearing no relation to the statute's thrust, and identify the similarities as
limits on the general language which follows.
229. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

25

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

be challenged by critics as inconsistent with federal interpretations of Title
11.230

The majority's analysis of the private club exemption should have a
clarifying impact on those courts persuaded by the opinion. The court's
analysis provides a possible cure for the defect suffered by many opinions
which deny a group is selective in the face of clear evidence that the group is
highly selective on the basis of race."' The court stated that in determining
the selectivity of the organization, it was important to look at the nexus
between the purpose of the organization and its requirements for
membership. 2 2 Doing this allows courts to honestly discount racial
exclusion as evidence of true selectivity when, as is often the case, racial
exclusion bears no legitimate relation to the goals of the organization.
VI. CONCLUSION
The answer to the question, "Did Congress intend for Title II to apply to
membership organizations like BSA?" will likely be forever unknown. It is
probable that the obvious injustice of racial discrimination in permanent
physical facilities dominated congressional thinking and overshadowed other
possible scenarios. For federal courts in the Seventh Circuit, however, the
question is more properly phrased, "What did Congress say it meant?"
By asking the latter question, the court declined to fashion Title II as a
convenient tool, always available to the court as a weapon against virtually
any group whose discrimination the court deems unacceptable. Thus, the
court preserved the concept that it is Congress who should-and did-decide
what kind of power a tool like Title II ought to bear.
SANDRA J. COLHOUR

230. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. However, supporters of Power
Squadrons can distinguish it from Title II in that the New York statute contains a
much broader and more extensive list of examples. See United States Power
Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Board, 452 N.E.2d 1199, 1203 (N.Y. 1983).
Supporters of NOW may be able to support the New Jersey Superior Court's decision

by pointing to the case's statements that the Little League baseball fields satisfied any
substantive requirement of "place" required by the statute. National Organization for
Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33, 37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1974).
231. See supranotes 81-85 and accompanying text.
232. Welsh 111, 993 F.2d at 1277.
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